Knowledge and belief

English uses "know" and "believe" almost interchangeably. Logic cannot, because the two obey different laws — and the difference is exactly what makes a system able to model an agent that is confidently wrong.

The one law that separates them

Knowledge is factive. Belief is not.

If Alice knows the coin is heads, then the coin is heads. If Alice merely believes it, the coin may well be tails. Written out:

K[alice] h  →  h        holds always
B[alice] h  →  h        does NOT hold

Everything else follows from taking that seriously. A system with only one attitude has to pick: make it factive and you cannot model mistakes, or make it non-factive and you cannot model anything an agent has actually established.

Adding the leaning

The previous chapter gave each agent a relation meaning "cannot tell these apart". To get belief, delhi replaces it with an ordering: not just which worlds are possible, but which are more plausible.

carol: w0 < w1

Read it left to right: w1 is at least as plausible as w0. Plausibility increases along the arrow, and in the surface syntax it increases to the right.

This direction is worth pinning down, because an inverted ordering is still a perfectly valid model — nothing will complain, and every answer will be subtly backwards.

From that one ordering, both attitudes fall out:

Read overMeaning
K[a] φevery world the agent considers possibleknowledge
B[a] φonly the most plausible onesbelief

Carol considers both w0 and w1 possible, so she does not know which. But w1 is her most plausible world, so whatever is true there is what she believes.

What each obeys

The two attitudes end up satisfying different axiom systems. You do not need these to use delhi, but they are the standard names and they say precisely what each attitude promises:

Knowledge is S5.

  • K[a] φ → φ — what you know is true (factivity)
  • K[a] φ → K[a] K[a] φ — you know what you know (positive introspection)
  • ¬K[a] φ → K[a] ¬K[a] φ — you know what you don't know (negative introspection)

Belief is KD45. The same introspection, and consistency in place of factivity:

  • B[a] φ → ¬B[a] ¬φ — you never believe a thing and its negation (consistency)
  • B[a] φ → B[a] B[a] φ, ¬B[a] φ → B[a] ¬B[a] φ — introspection, as above

Notice what belief keeps: an agent can be wrong, but not incoherent. Sally believes the marble is in the basket when it is not; she does not simultaneously believe it is not.

delhi verifies these as frame properties rather than assuming them — see Operators.

Two more, and why

Knowledge and belief are the two you will reach for. delhi carries two more because the gap between them turns out to be where the useful questions live.

Safe belief, [][a] φ — true in every world at least as plausible as the current one. It sits between the other two: stronger than belief, weaker than knowledge. Its point is stability — a safe belief survives learning any true fact, where a mere belief can be overturned by one.

It is measured from the actual world rather than from a fixed set, which gives it a character quite unlike the other two and makes it the subject of its own chapter: Safe belief.

Conditional belief, B^ψ[a] φ — what the agent would believe if it learned ψ. This is the one that makes revision predictable: you can ask what Alice's belief would become before telling her anything, and the answer is already determined by her ordering.

$ delhi eval examples/coin_lie.delhi -f "B[carol] h"        # believes heads
true
$ delhi eval examples/coin_lie.delhi -f "B^(!h)[carol] h"   # ...but would give it up
false

An agent that could not be told anything is not a believer, just a fact table with extra steps. Conditional belief is what encodes the difference.

The whole point

Put the pieces together and you can express a state no purely fact-based system can:

B[carol] h  &  !h  &  K[alice] !h

Carol believes heads, it is tails, and Alice knows it is tails. Three agents, one coin, and a disagreement that is not a contradiction — because belief is not factive, and each agent's ordering is its own.

The next chapter goes one level up: what Alice believes about what Carol believes, and why that is where the genuinely hard cases start.